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of board size and shown a robust negative relationship between board size
and firm performance. The evidence on smaller closely held firms is less clear;
we argue that existing work has been incomplete in analyzing the causal rela-
tionship due to weak identification strategies. Using a rich data set of almost
6,000 small and medium-sized closely held corporations we provide a causal
analysis of board size effects on firm performance using a novel instrument
given by the number of children of the founders of the firms. First, we find
no empirical evidence of adverse board size effects when the size of the board
lies in the typical range for closely held corporations of three to six directors.
Second, we find a significantly negative board size effect for the minority
of closely held firms that are characterized by having comparatively large
boards of seven or more members and non-complex operations.
1 Introduction
The structure and size of corporate boards have received much attention in
the media and in the business community recently, fuelled by the prominent
business failures of large companies such as Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat.
The general view that board characteristics matter is reflected by an abun-
dance of national and international guidelines for good corporate governance.
A survey of the codes of conduct reveals that without exemption, a substan-
tial amount of space is devoted to the specific organization of the corporate
board.1 Nine of the fifty-one codes in the survey even go as far as to rec-
ommend specific size limitations on the number of directors. These size
recommendations find their support in recent empirical research, which has
established a negative relationship between board size and firm performance.
Corporate boards are endogenously determined institutions and board
size depends on a number of observable firm characteristics e.g. firm size,
ownership distribution, level of diversification, etc. Board size is also likely
to depend on a number of unobserved factors, including factors that are
potentially correlated with firm performance. This makes a causal interpre-
tation of the observed correlation between board size and performance highly
contestable even when it is possible to control for observable determinants
of board size. The contribution of the present paper is to provide a causal
1All codes of conduct for good corporate governance that were available on the home-
page of the European Corporate Governance Institute (www.ecgi.org) in January 2005
were collected and analyzed for discussions of the structure and role of the corporate
board. The most recently issued code by either a governmental body or the local stock
exchange was picked for each country, providing a sample of 51 codes.
1
analysis of board size effects in close corporations by proposing an instru-
mental variable (IV) approach. Importantly, the great scope and level of
detail of our data will allow us to define an instrument for board size, the
number of founders’ children. The use of this instrument is firmly grounded
in the institutional setting surrounding most closely held corporations.
The empirical analysis is based on a representative sample of 5,830 small
and medium-sized closely held Danish corporations. We obtained the name
and social security number of everyone who has founded a firm in Denmark
and those of all close family members. The core instrument used for board
size is the number of founders’ children over the age of thirty. It is shown
that this instrument correlates with board size. In addition, we discuss in
detail the claim that the founders’ family relations are unrelated to firm
performance when we control for observable determinants of performance.
Our empirical findings suggest that once we include a rich set of con-
trols available in our data, observed correlations between board size and
performance can indeed be given a causal interpretation. This in turn al-
lows us to analyze the relationship between board size and performance in
a less restrictive framework than that applied in previous studies, generat-
ing new insights into the relationship between the number of directors and
performance in small and medium-sized firms. First, there is no evidence
of an adverse board size effect for small and medium-sized closely held cor-
porations in firms where the board consists of the typical range of three to
six directors. Second, there is a significantly negative board size effect in a
minority of firms which have comparatively large boards of seven or more
members.
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The analysis of board size effects is then extended to the issue of com-
plexity of operations. In general, it should be expected that complex firms
have larger boards, because there is a greater need for advice and strategic
input from the directors. Accordingly, the final results show that the nega-
tive board size effect of seven or more directors disappears for firms that are
characterized by having complex operations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next subsection
we provide a brief survey on board size literature focusing on the method-
ological problems involved in giving a causal interpretation to the board
size/performance relationship. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3
establishes in detail the source of exogenous variation in board size, which
we derive from founders’ family relations. In Section 4 a standard OLS based
approach is used, the instrumental variable is introduced and finally a more
flexible model specification is estimated to show that no evidence exists of
a board size effect for small boards in closely held corporations. Section 5
analyzes the relationship between firm complexity and optimal board size.
We conclude and discuss our findings in Section 6.
1.1 A Brief Overview of the Board Size Literature with
a Focus on Causality
Theoretically, based on Mancur Olson’s arguments from his study on the
problems of collective actions, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992)
have argued that large corporate boards may be less efficient due to difficul-
ties in solving the agency problem among the members of the board. These
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authors conclude that large boards create less value than small boards.2 This
conclusion is summarized in the recent survey by Hermalin and Weisbach
(2003 - p. 13, their emphasis):
’The idea is that when boards become too big, agency problems
(such as director free-riding) increase within the board and the
board becomes more symbolic and less a part of the management
process.’
The survey by Hermalin and Weisbach also emphasizes that the corporate
board should be considered an endogeneously determined institution and its
organization (e.g. board size) depends on a number of firm characteristics.
A number of studies have analyzed the observable determinants of board
organization (see Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja 2005; Lehn, Patro and
Zhao 2004; Linck, Netter and Yang 2005 and Raheja 2005) although these
papers have little to say about the link between board size and performance.
The first empirical study of board size effects on performance was done
by Yermack (1996) who analyzes a panel of 452 large US firms in the period
from 1984 to 1991. Using a fixed effects approach, he shows that there is
a negative and significant board size effect on Tobin’s Q and that smaller
boards fire CEOs more frequently. The negative board size effect on perfor-
mance has been confirmed in a number of studies on large publicly traded
US firms. Other studies of large US firms provide evidence that the board
size effect depends on the organizational form; Adams and Mehran (2002)
find a positive board size effect for US banking firms whereas Coles, Daniel
2In fact Jensen (1993, p. 865) writes “When boards get beyond seven or eight people
they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control.”
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and Naveen (2004) show that the negative board size effects does not hold
for firms with complex operations.
There are several studies which show that the negative board size effect
also exists for publicly traded firms in other countries, for example: Conyon
and Peck (1998) in a sample of publicly traded firms in the UK, France,
the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy; Mak and Kusnadi (2001) in Malaysia
and Singapore; Lodrer and Peyer (2002) in Switzerland; and de Andres,
Azofra and Lopez (2005) in a sample of firms from ten OECD countries.
In contrast, Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2000) report insignificant
board size effects in Dutch firms while Black, Jang and Kim (2003) do so in
Korean firms. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) find positive board size effects in
Australia. Thus with few exceptions, the negative board size effect is well
established for large publicly held corporations across countries.
In a frequently cited study, Eisenberg et al. (1998) extended the analy-
sis of board size effects to include closely held corporations. The sample
used consisted of almost 900 small and medium-sized closely held corpora-
tions in Finland, where most of the firms had from three to seven directors
on the board. It was found that even for these small closely held corpora-
tions a significant negative board size effect existed. The estimated effect on
performance was large. For instance, according to their most conservative
estimates, an increase in board size, e.g. from 3 to 4 directors, would on av-
erage lower the returns on assets by approximately 11 percent at the sample
mean of 13 percent.
In sum, the negative board size effect has been confirmed by many studies
on publicly traded firms and by a single study of closely held corporations.
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This has created a general view in the literature that board size is negatively
related to performance for firms and boards of all sizes. Hermalin and Weis-
bach (2003) conclude: “The data therefore appear to reveal a fairly clear
picture: board size and firm value are negatively correlated”.3 This is in
contrast to the theoretical literature quoted above, which seems to imply
that a negative board size effect only kicks in at a relatively large number of
directors.
In the following, the negative board size effect in small and medium-sized
closely held corporations is questioned and two methodological weaknesses
in the single existing study of performance effects in small and medium-sized
firms, Eisenberg et al., are pointed out. Our approach is based on the view
that board size is determined by observed as well as unobserved firm charac-
teristics. First, an important determinant of board size (often not included
in the data) is the ownership structure of the firm. In particular, it is ex-
pected that the number of owners and the distribution of ownership do affect
board size. Corporations with a single owner tend to have smaller boards
than firms with multiple owners. Board members serve a distributional role
as agents for individual owners (Bennedsen 2001). Eisenberg et al. recognize
this relationship, but do not have data on ownership structures. Second, even
if detailed information on ownership were available, a more general concern
remains that board size could be correlated with the inherently unobserv-
able determinants of firm performance, suggesting that board size should be
3This tendency was confirmed by tracking papers and articles that discuss board size
effects using GOOGLE SCHOLAR. More than 50 articles state the existence of a negative
board size effect on large and small firms using the Eisenberg et al. study as their only
reference for the effect in small firms.
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treated as an endogenous regressor in order to estimate its causal effect on
performance.
Eisenberg et al. address this concern by modelling board size as a function
of performance, size, age and whether or not the firm belongs to a business
group.4 They do not take ownership variables into account. The performance
equation, on the other hand, models the return on assets (RoA) as a function
of board size, board member payment disturbances, the size and age of the
firm, and the change of total assets as a measure of growth opportunities.
The identification of board size effects in the performance relationship a
priori hinges on a single restriction, namely the exclusion of the business
group dummy from the relationship. Although this exclusion restriction is
crucial for the causal interpretation of the estimated board size effect, its
validity remains unsubstantiated. In fact, the corporate finance literature
has provided evidence of lower firm value and performance in business groups
(see Classens et al. 2002 and Volpin 2002 a.o.). Thus, the validity of the
Eisenberg et al. identifying assumption seems unfounded by the literature.
Studies on publicly traded firms have used other exclusion restrictions, for
example the implementation of anti-director rights, ownership concentration,
ownership by banks and institutional investors, network between boards in
financial and non-financial firms (Postma, van Ees and Sterken 2003); the
degree of state ownership (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid and Zimmermann 2003);
CEO tenure, CEO age, firm age and the amount of free cash flow (Coles,
Daniel and Naveen 2004); and the percentages of outside directors (de An-
dres et al. 2005). The validity of any of these seems questionable: It is
4See Table 3 of Eisenberg et al.
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difficult to argue that the variables do not have a direct effect on firm perfor-
mance, as would be required for valid identification. In addition to Demsetz
and Lehn (1985) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), there are numerous
studies showing the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance.
The efficiency and performance of state owned enterprises have been a ma-
jor concern in the expansive literature on privatization. The relationship
between performance, good governance and the number of outside directors
has been central in the debate over the last decade on how to improve the
quality of governance in corporations.5
While acknowledging the difficulties inherent in a full system analysis
of board size and firm performance, it is argued in this paper that valid
identifying assumptions can be established. In particular, it is shown that
identification of the causal effect going from board size variations to the
performance of small and closely held corporations can be derived from the
close family ties that characterize the majority of these firms. In comparison
to the system analyses found in the literature, our approach is focused upon
the causal performance effect while the determinants of board size are treated
as a reduced form.
2 The Data
Our data include all closely held corporations with limited liability in Den-
mark in 1999. The data originate from the annual reports that closely held
5In our survey of 51 codes of conducts, 47 of them recommend that corporate boards
should include a number of independent directors.
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corporations are required to submit to the Danish Ministry of Economic and
Business Affairs. The data include financial items from both the income
statement and the balance sheet, ownership information, and the name and
identity of the CEO and the board members.
Similar to most Western countries, Danish company law distinguishes be-
tween two types of closely held limited liability companies, a traditional joint
stock company and a less regulated version. In Denmark the two types are
denoted ’A/S’ and ’ApS’, respectively. The latter is the Danish equivalent of
the American ’S-Corp’ or the German ’GmbH’. The two company types dif-
fer substantially in terms of the regulations of boards, since ’A/S’-companies
are obliged to have a corporate board with at least 3 members, whereas it is
voluntary to establish a board for firms incorporated as ’ApS’. As a result,
only the population of consolidated joint stock companies (A/S), totalling
14,103 in 1999, are considered.
The standard selection criteria for performance evaluations is adhered to
while regulated industries and financial intermediaries are excluded from the
analysis, thereby reducing the number of firms to 7,960.6 A number of ex-
tremely small firms (primarily firms that were recently established) and firms
that have changed industry or reporting standards are also excluded. These
criteria are described in the appendix. As a result, 5,830 firms represent the
population for this analysis.
In addition to the gross sample, a sub sample of family-owned firms is
6Inter alia Utilities, financial intermediaries, business services, community, social and
personal service activities that are likely to be regulated industries are excluded. Our
sample consists of firms with primary industry affiliation within NACE groups 10 through
36 and 45 through 63.
9
examined. We use the definition of family businesses set up by Bennedsen
et al. (2004) based on current ownership characteristics. They define a
company as a family firm if members of a single family hold 50 percent or
more of the equity, which means that more than two-thirds of the firms in
the sample are family firms.
The main strategy used in identifying the causal effect of board size on
firm performance is based on information related to the founders of the firms.
Personal founder information is available for approximately one-third of the
firms in the gross sample of 5,830 firms.7 The additional data on founders
is from the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency, which handles the
registration of all Danish firms. The founders of a firm are defined as the one
or more individuals who filed the forms and officially registered the firm with
the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency. In most cases the founders
are one or more of the original owners. In any case, the founders can be held
liable for the firm’s activities until the company is formally incorporated.
Approximately one third of the firms with personal founders have a sin-
gle founder and approximately 90 percent of the firms have three or less
founders. Firms with ten or less founders only are considered in order to
limit the importance of special ownership arrangements with a very large
number of individual owners or founders.8 The name and CPR number (the
Danish equivalent to a social security number) of each founder was collected
and submitted to the CPR Agency in the Ministry of Interior, the gov-
ernment department responsible for administrating social security numbers.
7The sample contains an almost equal representation of family firms (with a coverage
rate of 34.0 percent) and non-family firms (30.8 percent).
8This excludes less than .4 per cent of the firms with available founder information.
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The agency then provided the family relations, including names and CPR
numbers of all nuclear family members.
There is a substantial reduction in the number of observations due to
the fact that founder information is available only for firms incorporated in
1986 or later. Similarly, the information is not available on firms registered
by other corporations, law firms, etc. Some firms, which have existed in an-
other form before their incorporation date (e.g. as ApS firms), may have a
registered firm age in the annual report which pre-dates 1986.9 The require-
ment of a maximum of ten founders and a registered firm age of 25 years or
less (motivated by the instrumental variables approach adopted in Section 3)
leaves a sample of 1,930 observations with the necessary founder information
of which 1,320 firms are family-owned.
The gross sample of 5,830 firms can be compared to the sample of 879
Finnish firms analyzed by Eisenberg et al. (1998).10 With an average board
size of 3.7 and median assets of DKK 7,636,000, figures for the Danish firms
are comparable to the corresponding figures of 3.7 and 5,498,000 (converted
to 1999-DKK) for the Finnish firms. The mean age of 19.5 years for the Dan-
ish firms, however, is well above the mean age of 10.8 reported by Eisenberg
et al. for the Finnish firms. Our sample is not comparable to the sam-
ples used by Yermack (1996) and others to study board size effects in large
publicly traded firms, where the firms and board sizes are much larger.
In Table 1, main variables in the gross and founder samples and their
9This is true for approximately 8 percent of the firms with available founder informa-
tion.
10Approximately 80 percent of the Finnish firms are classified as active in manufacturing
and trade.
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relationships to board size can be compared. It is clear from the table that
small and medium-sized firms dominate both samples. The number of direc-
tors appears to be positively related to firm size as measured by the assets
of the firm and to the number of owners of the firm. Indeed, most firms
have highly concentrated ownership, with an average of approximately two
owners.
Table 1 also provides evidence on the raw relationship between perfor-
mance and board size. For both samples, there are no noticeable differences
between the average RoAs of firms with 3, 4, 5 or 6 directors. Firms with
seven or more board members have on average lower RoAs, although it should
be noted that the latter category is quite thin. In conclusion, Table 1 illus-
trates that there is no apparent pattern of increased board size associated
with lower returns on assets among firms with small boards in the raw Danish
data.
3 Family Relationships as Exogenous Varia-
tion in Board Size
It has now been established that most closely held corporations are small,
have few owners, and are family controlled. In the following, it is argued that
exactly the fact that many closely held corporations have strong family ties
provides a valuable source of variation in their governance characteristics,
which can be claimed as exogenous in terms of corporate performance.
Specifically, the information on the family relationships of the founders of
the firm will be used when establishing valid instrumental variables for the
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relationship between corporate performance and corporate board size. Board
size is treated as being endogenous in the performance relationship and we
control for a rich set of observable determinants of current performance.
The candidate source of exogenous variation in board size is the number of
founders’ children.
Two conditions must be satisfied for the instrumental variable estima-
tion strategy to work. First, a systematic relationship should be established
between the founder-related instrumental variable and the current size of
the corporate board; and second, the founder-related information in itself
should not be related to the current performance of the firm given the set
of observable determinants of performance controlled for. Each condition is
considered in turn and evidence is provided to substantiate our claims.
First, when claiming the number of founders’ children as an exogenous
source of variation, the argument is that the size of the relevant ’pool’ of
director candidates increases with the number of founders’ children at or
above a certain age, in this case, 30 years of age.11 Moreover, if one family
member is admitted to the corporate board then—due to “equal treatment”
considerations—it is likely that further family members will be added, cre-
ating a tendency for corporate board size to vary according to the founders’
family size over and above variations that are due to differences in the number
of founders and owners.
11Although people between the ages of 18 and 29 are legally eligible to be board mem-
bers, we consider the thirty-year age limit to be more relevant in practical terms. Further-
more, out of the 21,547 board members in firms in the gross sample of 5,830 firms, only
5.1 percent are between the ages of 18 and 29. Section 5.1 checks the robustness of results
to the assumed age limit.
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Table 2 shows the mean number of founders and founders’ children in
firms with different board sizes. Evidence is provided for firms with founder
information in the gross sample and for the sample of family-owned firms.
The table indicates a general tendency toward a positive relationship between
board size and the number of founders’ children in both samples, although
less pronounced for comparatively large boards of six or seven members in
family firms. It should be noted that the data are comparatively thin for
the latter categories. To assess the significance of differences between board
sizes in the number of founders’ children we report two tests for each sample.
One is a test of equal means of the individual board size categories whereas
the other test compares means between boards of three members and four
or more members. Both tests show very significant differences between the
categories. Whether a significant overall correlation can be established when
controlling for other determinants of board size, will be shown in the results
from the two-stage least squares estimation procedure applied in the next
section. Since it is mainly in family-related concerns that such a correlation
is expected to be produced, our prior is that the relationship is statistically
significant in family-owned firms, but less so in non-family owned firms.
Second, we need to establish that founder-related information is indeed
exogenous in a performance relationship. That is, based conditionally on
the observable determinants of current performance, no correlation should
exist between the instrumental variable, the number of founders’ children,
and unobservables affecting current firm performance. This claim rules out
the possibility of founders making fertility decisions based on characteristics
of the firm they founded or plan to found, other than the variables already
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included in the performance relationship. A time lag is imposed between
fertility decisions affecting founder-related information and the earliest foun-
dation date of any firm in the sample in order to limit the relevance of such
“reverse causality” considerations. Specifically, an upper 25-year limit on
firm age and a lower 30-year age limit for founders’ children ensure a sepa-
ration of at least five years between fertility decisions determining founders’
family size (the people included were born before 1970 and the firms were
founded 1975 at the earliest).1213
The exogeneity claim is also supported by the fact that it is possible to
control for a very rich set of current firm characteristics in the data. Our claim
is that once we control for this set of observables that includes information
on the distribution of ownership, there will be no further direct or indirect
effects of the number of founders’ children on current performance. This
exclusion restriction is of course contestable. Even without any direct causal
link between fertility and the foundation of firms, a non-zero correlation
could exist between a founder’s fertility and current unobservables in the
performance of the firm. Innate ability in managing a firm and fertility could
be related (most likely positively). On the other hand, there is a trade-off
12Because only founder data on firms registered as joint stock companies in 1986 or later
could be obtained, most of the firms included were established in 1986 or later. Thus, for
the majority of the firms, the time lag between fertility decisions and establishing the firm
is more than 15 years.
13The time lag also solves any potential identification problems arising from board or-
ganization being “sticky”, i.e. the fact that changes in board organization are rare. The
presence of stickiness implies that current board organization may be related to lagged de-
terminants. However, due to the lag between fertility decisions and firm establishment any
lagged variable affecting current board size will be subsequent to our choice of instrument.
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between time invested in child-bearing and in acquiring managerial skills,
thus a priori no definite sign for such a correlation is apparent.
Another potential source of correlation could be derived from the process
of CEO choice in family firms. The pool of within-family management talent
is non-decreasing in family size. If the CEO is chosen within the family, then
founders’ family size should impact non-negatively on firm performance. On
the other hand, the tendency to choose a family CEO and potentially neglect
outside management talent also increases proportionally with family size, as
evidenced by recent findings in Bennedsen et al. (2004). We control for direct
performance effects of the presence of a family CEO by including a dummy
for firms where a family relationship exists between the CEO and one or
more of the owners or the CEO herself is an owner. Moreover, the firms in
our sample are inherently fairly young, few of them having undergone any
generational change in management. Again, the net impact, if any, on firm
performance via a family CEO channel appears ambiguous.
As a result, we conclude in favor of the main exogeneity assumption: Any
effect of founders’ family relationships on current performance runs via the
size of the corporate board and not through current but unobserved aspects
of the management of the firm.
A potential alternative strategy would be to rely on the family relations
of the current owners for identifying the board size/performance relationship.
Indeed, 74 percent of the family-controlled firms in our 1999 sample are still
owned by at least one of the original founders and most of the exogeneity
arguments would apply equally well to the case of current owners. However,
for firms in the sample with a change in ownership before 1999, the time
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lapsed between decisions is inherently shorter. This introduces a further
potential source of correlation since the decision to buy a particular firm may
be guided by unobserved firm characteristics related both to performance
and to the family relations of the new owners. In contrast, for the analysis
based on founder information, the change in ownership merely weakens the
relationship between the number of founders’ children and current board
size, but does not affect the exogeneity status of the former variable in the
performance equation. Thus in the main analysis in Section 5, a conservative
choice of instrument was chosen in terms of the number of founders’ children.
In view of the fact that many of the founders are still the current owners,
the current owner alternative below will be considered briefly to determine
whether concerns about exogeneity for this variable matter empirically.
4 The Link between Board Size and Firm
Performance
This section reexamines the empirical relationship between board size and
firm performance. To mirror the existing literature, the OLS relationship
is estimated using standard controls for size, age, and the degree of diver-
sification of the firm (a dummy for multiple business segments) as well as
membership of a business group.14 Ownership and founder variables avail-
able in the data set are added as additional controls. We proceed with the
IV analysis using the number of founders’ children as an exogenous source
of variation in board size. Based on the conclusions from the IV analysis,
14Industry dummies at the two-digit NACE level are included throughout.
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the performance equation with a more flexible specification of board size ef-
fects is reconsidered in the final subsection. Summary measurements of the
variables included in the regressions are found in Table 3.
4.1 Basic Ordinary Least Squares Results
The dependent variable in the performance equation is the return on assets
(RoA) of the firm in 1999. This performance measure is known to be quite
noisy, although few good alternatives exist when analyzing the performance
of closely held firms. The variable of main interest and the number of board
members are entered linearly in the basic specification. Other studies have
imposed a log transformation, e.g. Yermack (1996), or even used a twice
log-transformed version, as in Eisenberg et al. (1998). It is noted that the
range of variation in board size is narrow and, if anything, the unconditional
relationship between board size and performance in Table 1 suggests smaller
effects of absolute changes in board size in small boards than in comparatively
large boards, not larger effects as would be implied by a log transformation.
First a linear specification is used for the main analysis and then a more
flexible specification of board size is explored.
The following standard set of controls for firm performance is employed
throughout the empirical analysis: The number of employees (in logs) and
its square as a measure of the size of the firm; the age of the firm; and a
dummy for the firm being in a business group as well as a control variable
dummy for whether the firm is diversified.15
15Both Yermack (1996) and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) find evidence that more
diversified firms are less profitable. See the survey by Stein (2003).
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Variables related to ownership are also available due to the richness of
the data set, particularly information on the number of owners. Ownership
distribution - and especially the number of owners - may have a direct im-
pact on performance, since it is the main mechanism aligning the interest of
controlling and non-controlling owners (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000). As
is evident from Table 2, most firms indeed have very few owners with a gross
sample average of two. Ownership is represented by a set of dummy variables
for two, three or four or more owners with single-owned firms as the reference
category. An additional characteristic related to ownership is the presence
of a family CEO. Bennedsen et al. (2004) point out that most closely held
corporations are family-controlled, which they also associate with a tendency
to select a member of the family as the CEO. In order to control for a poten-
tial negative performance effect when narrowing the pool of potential CEO
candidates to the family, a dummy for firms with this characteristic was
included.
The final set of regressors control for the number of founders of the firm.
In Table 2, it is documented that the number of persons who founded the
firm is clearly correlated with firm characteristics already included in the
regression, in particular the size of the board. Other persistent determinants
of performance, however, could well exist that are unobserved and correlated
with the number of founders. In order to proxy for such effects, dummy
variables for having two or three or more founders are thus included in the
regression.
Table 4 reports the basic OLS regressions. The regression in column (1)
includes only board size and the standard controls, (2) adds information on
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ownership and the presence of a family CEO, and (3) has the founder dummy
variables. (1) and (2) can be estimated for the gross sample of 5,830 firms,
whereas the regression in (3) is reported only for the sample of 1,320 family-
controlled firms. Most effects of the standard controls are consistent across
the specifications.16 Firm size has an increasing although concave effect on
performance. More diversified firms have lower profits, whereas the business
group dummy is insignificant. Older firms seem slightly less profitable than
younger firms in the gross sample. The age effect is not significant in the
sample of family-controlled firms, which is mainly due to a smaller sample
size and the fact that firms in the latter sample have existed for 25 years or
less.
The performance effect of the board size in the gross sample is negative,
although small and insignificant. Adding ownership information and infor-
mation on the number of founders does not change that conclusion. The
ownership and CEO dummies are jointly significant when added in column
(2) (p-value 0.018), whereas the founder dummies are only marginally signif-
icant (p-value 0.102) in column (3), based on the family-controlled sample.
The consistency of the above results and their ceteris paribus interpre-
tation clearly rely on the exogeneity of all regressors in the performance
equation, including the board size variable. The next section examines the
empirical validity of this assumption.
16This is indeed the case throughout most of the empirical analysis and will only be
noted when exceptions occur.
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4.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation Results
The main issue is whether board size variations are endogenous in the perfor-
mance equation and whether any resulting inconsistencies matter substan-
tially for the estimated board size effect. As argued in the introduction, un-
observed performance determinants may exist that are also related to board
size. If so, the OLS results do not identify the causal effect of board size
variations on performance. The fact that the above regressions include a
rich set of controls is a partial remedy to this problem. To further investi-
gate the exogeneity issue, the proposed instrumental variable, the number of
founders’ children, is employed as a source of exogenous variation in board
size.17
Table 5 reports instrumental variables estimation results based on the
extended specification of the structural performance equation. Firms in-
cluded in this table are family-controlled firms with valid founder information
founded no more than 25 years ago. The performance equation is estimated
in a two-stage least squares procedure. The first stage is a reduced-form
regression of board size on the instrumental variables and on all the other
exogenous variables in the model. The second-stage regression includes the
predicted value of board size from the first-stage regression along with the
exogenous determinants of performance. Table 5 contains two sets of results.
Column (1) uses the exclusion of the number of founders’ children from the
17As discussed intensively in Section 4, our main identifying argument is that once we
have controlled for a rich set of potential performance determinants, including ownership
variables and the number of founders, then the variations in the number of founders’
children is unrelated to unobserved firm characteristics.
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performance equation to exactly identify the performance relationship while
column (2) adds its square as an additional instrument. This yields a testable
overidentifying restriction.
The signs of most effects in column (1) are unchanged compared to the
extended OLS results in Table 4. Some effects have increased in magnitude,
which is also true for their standard errors. The effect of board size is nega-
tive and larger in numerical value than in the OLS regression, but remains
insignificantly different from zero. On the other hand, even with the inflated
standard errors we can safely reject any negative board size effects in the
order of magnitude found by Eisenberg et al. (1998). The overidentified case
in column (2) shows somewhat reduced standard errors, but the board size
effect remains insignificant.
The relative precision of the instrumental variables estimates clearly rely
on the strength of the instrument applied here. A test of the validity of the
instrument is provided by the test of identification reported on the bottom
of Table 5. This is a test of a significant relationship between the potentially
endogenous regressor, board size, and the instrumental variable, the number
of founders’ children, conditional on the set of included exogenous regressors
in the performance equation. In the case of no significance, a “weak instru-
ments” problem exists. In order for an instrumental variable not to be weak,
Staiger and Stock (1997) argue that F -tests of significance should be at least
five. The number of founders’ children qualify as a valid instrument based on
this criterion with an F -test of identification of 8.00 and a very low p-value.
Having established a significant correlation between the proposed source
of exogenous variation and the size of the board, the instrumental variable
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can thus be used to address the question if the board size effect estimated
by a simple OLS regression is substantially biased or not. Table 5 reports
the Hausman test18 of the significance of the differences between the OLS
estimates in Table 4 (which are consistent and efficient if board size turns out
exogenous) and the IV results in column (1) in Table 5 (which are consistent
in any case). Based on the founders’ children instrument there is no evidence
that the OLS estimates are significantly biased, as the Hausman test has a
p−value of 57 percent. Thus, the OLS results are preferable on the grounds
of efficiency.
The robustness of this conclusion is checked in column (2) by adding the
number of founders’ children squared to the set of instruments. This adds
flexibility to the reduced-form relationship and the test of excluding both
instruments from the first-stage regression is again very significant. The
conclusion that OLS estimates are not significantly biased remains unaltered.
Moreover, having two instruments and one potentially endogenous variable,
one overidentifying restriction, which easily passes the Sargan test provided
in Table 5, can be tested, adding credibility to the core of the identifying
argument made in Section 4.
In conclusion, the number of founders’ children has been established as
a valid instrument for the performance equation. Both the OLS and IV
estimates of the effect of board size on firm performance are negative, al-
18The particular form of the test performed here is a residual-addition test, see e.g.
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). The test is based on adding the residual of the first
stage regression to the structural performance equation and testing its significance.
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though insignificant. Their orders of magnitude are significantly less than
the estimates of the existing study by Eisenberg et al. (1998).
4.3 Flexible Ordinary Least Squares Results
The above findings allow OLS estimation and thus more flexibility regard-
ing the functional form of board size effects.19 Two different approaches are
applied. The first approach uses the fact that board size is an integer to
construct dummy variables for boards of four, five, six and seven (or more)
members, while the second approach uses a piecewise linear approach similar
to that applied by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). It specifies a linear
relationship between board size and RoA, but allows for different slopes in
small (six or fewer members) and large boards (seven or more members). The
re-specifications of the board size variables are combined with the extended
OLS specification from Table 4, column (2). The effects of other perfor-
mance determinants are largely unaltered by introducing a flexible board
size specification. They are therefore not reported in Table 6.
The unrestricted dummy variable specification in column (1) suggests no
effects of boards of three to six members. Boards with seven or more mem-
bers are associated with a significantly lower RoA. The F -test of excluding
dummies for small boards of six or less members is easily accepted. The
restricted specification reported in column (2) shows a strongly significant
effect of large boards.
19See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, section 7.6) for a discussion of potential problems
with the IV estimation when the endogenous regressor enters non-linearly in the structural
equation.
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For the piecewise linear approach, a change in the slope of the board
size/performance relationship at six board members is allowed for. The
breakpoint at six is suggested by the unconditional RoAs reported for each
board size in Table 1 and by the theoretical considerations discussed in Sec-
tion 2. Again, the effect is found to be insignificant in small boards. Increas-
ing the board size only appears to be associated with a significantly lower
RoA in comparatively large boards with seven or more members.
The results of the flexible models are thus supportive of the prediction
by Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) that negative board size
effects due to agency problems become relevant in boards with seven or more
members. The findings in this paper are also consistent with Yermack’s
(1996) finding of a negative board size effect in boards of seven or more
members. On the other hand, our results are contrary to the findings of
Eisenberg et al. (1998) on two accounts. First, no evidence of negative board
size effects in small boards was found. Secondly, the magnitude of the board
size effect in boards of seven or more members is much smaller than that
estimated by Eisenberg et al. The estimates reported in Table 6, column (4)
predict that increasing the size of the board e.g. from six to seven members
would lower the RoA by somewhat less than half a percentage point. The
Eisenberg et al. study estimates an effect of five percentage points for a
similar change.
4.4 Robustness Checks
This section summarizes analyses on the robustness of the results of the
main analysis. Two robustness checks are performed regarding the validity
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of the identification strategy. The core identification argument relied on
family characteristics to instrument board size in family-run firms, thereby
establishing whether board size is endogenous or not. The robustness of
this argument to the particular age limit imposed on founders’ children in
defining the instrumental variable is addressed first. As an alternative age
criterion, the legal age limit of 18 is considered. Secondly, the number of
children of current owners as an alternative instrument is examined. This
variable is available for a large proportion of firms in the gross sample, thus
allowing more precise inference.
4.4.1 Instrument Defined by the Legal Age Limit
In the main analysis, the number of founders’ children aged 30 or above as
the instrument for board size. A less restrictive age limit will now be used
and all founders’ children aged 18, the legal minimum age for members of a
corporate board in Denmark, or above, in 1999 will be considered.
The thirty-year age limit in the main analysis was chosen under the as-
sumption that people below this age are less likely potential board member
candidates. If this argument is valid, a weaker relationship would be ex-
pected between board size and founders’ children above the legal age limit
of 18 than in the main analysis. On the other hand, an argument for in-
cluding young adults between the ages of 18 and 29 in the analysis is that
even though it was shown that this group only constitutes a small part of
the aggregate number of board members, family-related board members are
probably overrepresented in the group.
The sample of firms in the founder sample (a total of 1,320 firms) remains
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unchanged in this analysis, whereas the values of the instrumental variable for
some firms will change because all children above the legal minimum age of
18 are now counted. Redefining the instrumental variable means that a time
separation of at least five years between fertility and foundation decisions is
no longer imposed.20
The results are reported in column (1) of Table 7. Using the number of
founders’ children aged 18 or above as the instrument for board size yields
the same basic conclusions as in the main analysis: The estimated impact
of board size on firm performance is negative, but insignificant, and OLS
estimates of board size effects would not be significantly biased. Consistent
with the view maintained in the main analysis that the age limit of 30 is
more relevant in practical terms, identification weakens when the age limit
is lowered. However, the test of identification is still well above the Staiger
and Stock (1997) criterion and the redefined instrument cannot be classified
as weak.
In conclusion, identification of the relationship weakens, but the main
results from the IV analysis are robust with regard to the particular age
limit used for the founders’ children when defining the pool of candidate
board members.
20The results are essentially unaltered if the five-year separation is restored by excluding
firms founded before 1986 (the children included in the analysis are born in 1981 or earlier).
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4.4.2 Current Owners’ Children as Exogenous Variation in Board
Size
The instrumental variable estimation strategy focuses on founders’ children
as the relevant pool of candidate board members rather than current own-
ers’ children. Essentially, it is necessary for the instrumental variable not to
correlate with current performance, given the observable performance deter-
minants included in the model. As argued in Section 4, the founder-based
strategy is considered conservative in terms of the critical a priori argument
of exogeneity of the instrumental variable. This argument seems less com-
pelling, however, for the case of owners’ children.
Nonetheless, the added credibility of the founder-based instrument comes
at a potential cost in terms of the precision of the estimates because the
alternative, the number of current owners’ children, is expected to show
a higher correlation with current board size and is available for a larger
proportion of the firms in the gross sample. Thus, in this section, IV results
that employ the owner-based instrumental variable will be presented.
The only firms included were those where social security numbers and
family information for all owners were available. The number of firms satis-
fying this criterion was 2,578, almost doubling the size of the sample. Column
(2) in Table 7 reports the results from the IV estimates using current owners’
children more than 30 years of age as the instrument for board size.
Again, the basic insights from the main analysis are confirmed. Board
size has a negative, although insignificant effect on performance. The test
of identification reveals that the number of current owners’ children is a
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stronger instrument for board size, whereas the test for whether board size
is endogenous remains insignificant.21
5 Complexity of Operations and the Impact
of Board Size on Performance
The results reported for the flexible OLS specifications in Table 6 support
the prediction from the theoretical literature that negative board size effects
occur in comparatively large boards. In this section, whether or not the
effects are dependent on the complexity of firms’ operations are investigated.
As argued in the introduction, boards serve many different roles in a cor-
poration, members contributing a number of different competencies. Fama
and Jensen (1983) point out that firm organization depends on the scope and
complexity of its operations. Firms with complex operations are character-
ized by a more decentralized decision making and information structure in
which the ’benefits from better decision making can be achieved by delegating
decision functions to agents at all levels of the organization who have spe-
cific knowledge ... Control of the agency problems in such diffuse decision
systems is achieved by separating the ratifying and monitoring of decisions
21The case reported in Table 7 is precisely identified which means that the exogeneity
of the instrument cannot be tested. If the squared number of owners’ children is added
as an additional instrument, the implied overidentifying restriction with a p-value of 72.3
percent cannot be rejected. This lends credibility to the exogeneity assumption, also for
the case of current owners.
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(decision control) from the initiation and implementation (decision manage-
ment)’, Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 322).
Thus, it follows that the monitoring role and information requirements
of the board increases with the complexity of the operations; hence, com-
plex operations induce a larger board. When board size of these firms is
changed, there is a trade off between the positive effects of adding compe-
tencies and improving monitoring and the negative effect of increasing the
free-rider problem among directors. This implies that firms with complex
operations should ceteris paribus have larger boards and that any negative
effects of having large boards become dominant only with a higher number
of board members, or perhaps not at all.
Following the idea proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983)22, we test whether
or not the negative board size effect persists for firms with complex opera-
tions. We proxy the complexity of firms’ operations by two variables: a
dummy for the firm being in a business group and a dummy for the firm
operating in more than one business segment. All models considered in the
main analysis included controls for the performance effects of these complex-
ity measures. In Table 8, these models have been extended by interacting
the two proxies with the following flexible board size specification: A linear
effect and an interaction of the linear effect with a dummy for firms having
more than six board members.
From Table 8, it is evident that the negative effect of large boards dis-
appears in complex firms. When complexity is measured by the firm being
22In a recent paper Coles et al. (2004) show that the negative board size effect for large
publicly held firms disappears for firms with complex operations.
30
part of a business group as in column (1), the significantly negative effect of
boards of seven or more members (LB) is seen to be counterbalanced, almost
one-to-one, by a significant interaction term for firms with large boards and
complex operations (CLB). The net effect of large boards in firms with com-
plex operations is estimated to −0.0065 + 0.0071 = 0.0006. Indeed, a test of
LB and CLB having equal effects with opposite signs cannot be rejected by a
wide margin (the test of a zero net effect yields a p−value of 79 percent). The
interactions between the two board variables and the complexity measure are
jointly significant at a one percent level. Similarly, the joint test of the two
linear board size terms, BS and CBS, cannot reject the null hypothesis with
a p−value of 81 percent.
The results in column (1), therefore, show that the negative performance
effect of large boards is dominant only in firms with non-complex opera-
tions. There is no evidence of negative performance effects of small boards
regardless of whether the firms are in a business group or not.
The second set of results is reported in Column (2) of Table 8, which
employs a dummy for multiple business segments as the measure of complex
operations and confirms the main finding of a countervailing effect in firms
with complex operations, although less significantly. The complexity mea-
sures are found to be jointly significant at the ten percent level. The net effect
of large boards in complex firms is estimated at−0.0022 (= −0.0053+0.0032)
and is not statistically different from zero. Using the multiple business seg-
ment dummy as a proxy for complex operations, no evidence was found of
a negative board size effect of small boards in general and no effect of large
boards in firms that operate in more than one business segment was found.
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In conclusion, and in accordance with the theoretical predictions, the
negative performance effect of large boards is found to be relevant only in non-
complex firms. This finding adds further credibility to the main conclusion
that the negative board size effect only occurs in comparatively large boards.
6 Discussion
A primary contribution of this paper is to produce estimates of the effect of
board size on performance that can be given a causal interpretation. More-
over, we find that standard OLS results provide valid and precisely estimated
yet insignificant effects.
Based on these findings, a flexible model specification was then analyzed.
First, no performance effects were found when varying the board size at levels
below six directors, the typical range of board size in closely held corpora-
tions. Second, a significantly negative effect was found when increasing the
size of boards with seven or more members and complex operations. This is
consistent with the findings in Yermack (1996) on listed US corporations and
shows that a negative board size extends to small and medium-sized closely
held firms, but only to the minority of firms with comparatively large boards
and complex firm structure. The performance of the great majority of closely
held firms shows no signs of being adversely affected by small increases in
the size of their boards.
Overall, our analysis challenges the existence of a negative board size
effect for small boards in closely held corporations. As theory suggests,
there are good reasons not always to choose the minimum board size. Given
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that board organization and the optimal number of directors occupy such a
prominent place in many guidelines for good corporate governance and are
discussed intensively in the business media and within many corporations, we
believe our analysis, together with the well-established negative board size
effect in large publicly traded firms, contains a clear policy message: Finding
the right number of directors is a trade off between the benefits of having
sufficient competencies represented and the cost arising from increased free
riding among board members. Each firm must find the best trade off, and
for most small and medium-sized firms this will be anything from three to
six board members. Firms that are characterized by having a complex struc-
ture of operation through membership in business groups or that operate in
multiple business segments may indeed prefer to exceed this range and add
one or slightly more directors.
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Appendix
This appendix describes the criteria used in the data selection. The total
population of closely held corporations (only ’A/S’ firms are included, see
section 2) in Denmark totalled 14,103 firms in 1999. The exclusion criteria
consist of three steps. First, the analysis is focused upon firms operating
in non-regulated industries. Second, firms that are newly established, have
gone through bankruptcy procedures or are under restructuring are removed.
Third, very small firms and firms with missing observations are excluded.
All of the above selection criteria are imposed to avoid any major changes
in valuation principles due to firms under restructuring, firms with extreme
growth due to recent establishment, etc. While some of the adjustments
could potentially be related to the current performance of the firm, none of
the conclusions reported in this paper are altered by these selection criteria.
The implications of the three steps in the selection procedure on the sample
size are described below.
Step 1: Exclude regulated industries. A total of 6,143 firms operating in
regulated industries are excluded; as well as utilities (25), financial intermedi-
ation, business services and community, social and personal service activities
(6,118). A further 345 firms that did not report their industry classification
are also excluded. The number of firms is thereby reduced to 7,615.
Step 2: Exclude newly established firms and firms undergoing bankruptcy
or restructuring. A total of 1,604 firms, inactive at some point from 1996
to 1998 were eliminated. The majority of these firms are newly established.
A further 358 firms experiencing structural changes from 1998 to 1999 were
eliminated: a change in business group affiliation (34), a change in industry
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code (80), reporting of extraordinary profits (210) and financial distress due
to bankruptcy (31). The number of firms is thereby reduced to 5,998.
Step 3: Exclude extremely small firms and firms with missing information.
There were 66 firms that did not report the number of employees. Finally, 102
extremely small firms that reported primo assets of less than 1 million DKK
(approximately 170K USD using the 1999 exchange rate) were excluded,
leaving 5,830 firms for the population of this analysis.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on ownership, assets and returns on assets for different board 
size categories 
This table reports the mean and median number of owners, the book value of assets and the return 
on assets (RoA) for board size categories ranging from 3 to 7+. Medians are reported in 
parentheses. Gross Sample is the full sample of firms used in the analysis (see Section 2), whereas 
Founder Information is the sub-sample of firms for which we were able to obtain information on 
the founder of the firm (see Section 2 for further details). 
 Gross Sample  Founder Information 
Board Size N Owners Assets RoA n Owners Assets RoA 
         
3 3,503 1.70 
(1.00) 
11,161 
(6,098) 
0.0782 
(0.0708)
1,307 1.63 
(1.00) 
7,817 
(4,809) 
0.0924 
(0.0885)
4 1,253 2.21 
(2.00) 
33,160 
(8,124) 
0.0783 
(0.0762)
390 2.15 
(2.00) 
54,430 
(6,155) 
0.0899 
(0.0860)
5 696 2.72 
(2.00) 
29,587 
(13,609)
0.0783 
(0.0769)
161 2.68 
(2.00) 
23,590 
(9,216) 
0.0944 
(0.0970)
6 236 3.09 
(3.00) 
150,382 
(25,855)
0.0765 
(0.0706)
47 3.23 
(3.00) 
43,972 
(19,018) 
0.0913 
(0.0970)
7+ 142 3.82 
(3.00) 
292,656 
(61,441)
0.0377 
(0.0535)
25 3.45 
(3.00) 
125,644 
(16,839) 
0.0558 
(0.0607)
         
Total 
 
5,830 2.04 
(2.00) 
30,582 
(7,636) 
0.0771 
(0.0719)
1,930 
 
1.88 
(2.00) 
20,757 
(5,503) 
0.0916 
(0.0888)
 
 
Table 2: The link between founder family characteristics and board size 
This table reports the mean number of founders and mean number of founders’ children aged 30 or 
above for board size categories ranging from 3 to 7+. Gross Sample is the full sample of firms used 
in the analysis (see Section 3), whereas Family Controlled is the sub-sample of family firms where 
a single family holds a majority of the equity. Founder Information is the sub-sample of firms for 
which we were able to obtain information on the founder of the firm (see Section 3 for further 
details). The rows labelled Difference between … denote two tests of the equality of means 
between firms of board sizes: The first test is between all five board size categories. The second 
test is between firms with three directors and firms with more than three directors. Numbers in 
brackets are p-values, whereas *** denotes significance at 1 percent level. 
 Gross Sample  
& Founder Information 
Family Controlled  
& Founder Information 
Board Size n Founders Children  
(Age 30+) 
n Founders Children 
(Age 30+) 
       
3 1,307 2.24 0.92 1,001 2.21 0.91 
4 390 2.36 1.10 223 2.29 1.25 
5 161 2.57 1.33 78 2.65 1.54 
6 47 2.47 1.40 11 2.36 0.90 
7+ 25 2.92 1.68 7 3.29 3.57 
Total 1,930 2.30 1.01 1,320 2.26 1.02 
Difference between groups 5.05*** 
[0.000] 
  6.63*** 
[0.000] 
Difference between 3 and 4+ 18.7*** 
[0.000] 
  28.7*** 
[0.000] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on regression variables 
This table summarizes the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the 
variables used in the regressions throughout the paper. Panel A shows the statistics for the Gross 
Sample, whereas Panel B shows the statistics for the Family Controlled with Founder Information 
sample. Gross Sample is the full sample of firms used in the analysis (see Section 3), whereas 
Family Controlled with Founder Information is the sub-sample of family firms where a single 
family holds a majority of the equity for which we were able to obtain information on the founder 
of the firm (see Section 3 for further details). 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 
Panel A: Gross Sample (n=5,830) 
Return on Assets 0.0770 0.0719 0.120 -0.8401 1.4078 
Board Size 3.70 3 1.106 3 15 
Employees 37.2 12 304.00 1 18,270 
Firm Age 19.5 15 17.04 1 344 
Multiple Business Segments 0.475 0 0.499 0 1 
Business Group 0.062 0 0.241 0 1 
Number of Owners 2.042 2 1.262 1 16 
Family CEO 0.635 1 0.481 0 1 
 
Panel B: Family Controlled with Founder Information (n=1,320) 
Return on Assets 0.0904 0.0858 0.114 -0.8069 0.5666 
Board Size 3.34 3 0.716 3 10 
Employees 14.2 9 30.47 1 763 
Firm Age 9.5 9 3.823 1 25 
Multiple Business Segments 0.403 0 0.491 0 1 
Business Group 0.018 0 0.134 0 1 
Number of Owners 1.493 1 0.795 1 9 
Family CEO 0.957 1 0.203 0 1 
Number of Founders 2.255 3 1.065 1 9 
      
 
Table 4: OLS estimates of the board size-firm performance relationship 
The dependent variable is the return on assets (RoA). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based 
on robust standard errors. Each equation also includes intercept and industry dummies on the two-
digit NACE level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels in a two-sided 
test, respectively. 
 
Estimation Method 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
A. Board Variables    
Board Size -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0041 
 (-1.49) (-1.61) (-0.98) 
B. Controls    
Employees (log) 0.0146*** 0.0138*** 0.0277*** 
 (3.92) (3.67) (2.61) 
Employees (log, squared) -0.0021*** -0.002*** -0.0058** 
 (-3.47) (-3.34) (-2.49) 
Firm Age -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0003 
 (-6.43) (-6.43) (-0.38) 
Multiple Business Segments -0.0071** -0.0071** -0.006 
 (-2.20) (-2.20) (-0.87) 
Business Group 0.0056 0.0067 0.0442 
 (0.90) (1.07) (1.51) 
    
C. Ownership    
Two Owners  0.012*** 0.0124* 
  (3.17) (1.64) 
Three Owners  0.0001 -0.008 
  (0.02) (-0.49) 
Four or More Owners  0.0076 -0.0152 
  (1.30) (-0.84) 
Family CEO  0.0031 0.0165 
  (0.78) (1.13) 
D. Founders    
Two Founders   -0.0051 
   (-0.44) 
Three or More Founders   0.012* 
   (1.80) 
    
N 5830 5830 1320 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.08 
    
 
 
Table 5: IV estimates of the board size-firm performance relationship 
The dependent variable is the return on assets (RoA). We use Number of founders’ children aged 30 
or above as the instrument for board size (see Section 4 for a motivation of the instrument). The 
table reports the second stage from the two-stage-least-squares estimation. Identification is an F-test 
of the significance of the instrument in the first-stage regression. Hausman is a test of significant 
bias in the corresponding OLS estimates. Overidentifying Restrictions is the Sargan test of the 
overidentifying restrictions implied by additional instruments. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics, whereas numbers in brackets are p-values. Both are computed using robust standard 
errors. Each equation also includes intercept and industry dummies on the two-digit NACE level. *, 
** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels in a two-sided test, respectively. 
 
Estimation Method 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
A. Board Variables   
Board Size -0.0216 -0.0115 
 (-0.71) (-0.64) 
B. Controls   
Employees (log) 0.0250** 0.0266** 
 (2.15) (2.40) 
Employees (log, squared) -0.0045 -0.0053* 
 (-1.40) (-1.92) 
Firm Age -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-0.20) (-0.30) 
Multiple Business Segments -0.0065 -0.0062 
 (-0.93) (-0.89) 
Business Group 0.0453 0.0447 
 (1.56) (1.53) 
C. Ownership   
Two Owners 0.0139* 0.0131* 
 (1.74) (1.68) 
Three Owners -0.0029 -0.0058 
 (-0.15) (-0.35) 
Four or More Owners -0.0007 -0.0090 
 (-0.02) (-0.36) 
Family CEO 0.0125 0.0148 
 (0.75) (0.96) 
D. Founders   
Two Founders -0.0038 -0.0045 
 (-0.31) (-0.38) 
Three or More Founders 0.0127* 0.0123* 
 (1.88) (1.84) 
   
Identification 8.00*** 6.01*** 
 [0.005] [0.003] 
Hausman 0.33 0.15 
 [0.566] [0.694] 
Overidentifying Restriction  0.26 
  [0.607] 
   
N 1,320 1,320 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.11 0.11 
   
Table 6: Flexible OLS estimates of the board size-firm performance relationship 
The dependent variable is the return on assets (RoA). The models include control and ownership 
variables as specified in column (2) of Table 4 even though they are not reported. Each equation 
also includes intercept and industry dummies on the two-digit NACE level. Numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics, whereas numbers in brackets are p-values. Both are computed using robust standard 
errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels in a two-sided test, 
respectively. 
 
Estimation Method 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
A. Board Variables     
Dummy for Board Size = 4 -0.0015    
(BS4) (-0.37)    
Dummy for Board Size = 5 -0.0002    
(BS5) (-0.04)    
Dummy for Board Size = 6  0.0002    
(BS6) (0.03)    
Dummy for Board Size ≥ 7 -0.0315*** -0.0311***   
 (-2.88) (-3.01)   
Board Size   -3.4E-05  
   (-0.02)  
Board size * Dummy for    -0.0037*** -0.0038*** 
Board Size ≥ 7   (-2.47) (-3.09) 
     
Joint F-test, exclude BS4, BS5 and  0.05    
BS6 [0.985]    
     
B. Controls YES YES YES YES 
     
C. Ownership YES YES YES YES 
     
N 5830 5830 5830 5830 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7: Robustness of IV estimates of the board size-firm performance relationship 
The dependent variable is the return on assets (RoA). Columns (1) and (2) use the number of 
Founders’ Children(Age 18+) and number of current Owners’ Children (Age 30+) as the 
instrument for board size, respectively. The table reports the second stage from the two-stage-least-
squares estimation. Identification is an F-test of the significance of the instrument in the first-stage 
regression. Hausman is a test of significant bias in the corresponding OLS estimates. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics, whereas numbers in brackets are p-values. Both are computed using 
robust standard errors. 
 
Estimation Method 
Instrument 
(1) 
IV 
Founders’ Children 
(Age 18+) 
(2) 
IV 
Owner’s Children 
(Age 30+) 
A. Board Variables   
Board Size -0.0185 -0.0221 
 (-0.41) (-1.02) 
B. Controls   
Employees (log) 0.0255** 0.0171** 
 (2.04) (1.99) 
Employees (log, squared) -0.0048 -0.0022 
 (-1.18) (-1.01) 
Firm Age -0.0002 -0.0016*** 
 (-0.22) (-3.97) 
Multiple Business Segments -0.0064 -0.0094* 
 (-0.93) (-1.95) 
Business Group 0.0451 0.0108 
 (1.55) (0.86) 
C. Ownership   
Two Owners 0.0137* 0.0142** 
 (1.65) (2.22) 
Three Owners -0.0038 -0.0021 
 (-0.17) (-0.14) 
Four or More Owners -0.0033 0.0381* 
 (-0.08) (1.69) 
Family CEO 0.0132 -0.0007 
 (0.71) (-0.05) 
D. Founders   
Two Founders -0.0040  
 (-0.31)  
Three or More Founders 0.0126*  
 (1.85)  
   
Identification 6.34** 14.7*** 
 [0.012] [0.002] 
Hausman 0.10 1.21 
 [0.750] [0.271] 
   
N 1,320 2,578 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.111 0.111 
   
 
Table 8: OLS estimates of the board size-firm performance relationship controlling for 
complexity of operations 
The dependent variable is the return on assets (RoA). The models include control and ownership 
variables specified as in column (2) of Table 4 even though they are not reported. Each equation 
also includes intercept and industry dummies on the two-digit NACE level. Board Variables 
interact with two measures of complex operations: a dummy for the firm being a Business Group 
and a dummy for Multiple Business Segments defined as operations in more than one industry, 
respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, whereas numbers in brackets are p-values. 
Both are computed using robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels in a two-sided test, respectively. 
 
Estimation Method 
Complexity Measure 
(1) 
OLS 
Business Group 
(2) 
OLS 
Multiple Business 
Segments 
A. Board Variables   
Board Size 0.0002 -0.0012 
(BS) (0.07) (-0.39) 
Board Size * Dummy for Board Size ≥ 7 -0.0065*** -0.0053** 
(LB) (-3.27) (-2.34) 
 
Interacted with Dummy for Complex Operations 
Board Size 0.0007 0.0023 
(CBS) (0.14) (0.64) 
Board Size * Dummy for Board size ≥ 7 0.0071** 0.0032 
(CLB) (2.29) (1.06) 
   
B. Controls YES YES 
   
C. Ownership YES YES 
   
Joint F-test, exclude CBS and CLB 6.42*** 2.36* 
 [0.002] [0.095] 
   
Joint F-test, exclude BS and CBS 0.21 0.02 
 [0.811] [0.980] 
   
F-test, LB and CLB, same effects, 0.07 1.24 
opposite signs [0.793] [0.266] 
   
N 5830 5830 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 
   
 
 
